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The Right of an Unmarried Cohabitant to
an Action for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress in California
One who negligently causes a disabling injury to an adult may also
reasonably expect in our contemporary society that the injuredper-
son may be cohabiting with another without benefit of marriage.1
During the last two decades, American society has experienced social
changes that have altered the traditional family unit.2 In particular, the
number of people who choose to cohabit without the formality of mar-
riage has increased dramatically The California Legislature and judici-
ary have attempted to resolve the legal issues surrounding these
relationships in the fields of housing,4 credit,5 family relations,6 and con-
tracts7 by granting unmarried cohabitants the equivalent legal rights pro-
vided married couples.8 In California, however, a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress has not been extended to unmar-
ried cohabitants.
The main reason for denying unmarried cohabitants an action for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress is ajudicial determination that a de-
fendant's liability should be limited to foreseeable plaintiffs.9 A
1. Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 68, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 503, 510(1983).
2. See infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
3. Approximately 1,560,000 unmarried couples share a household. This figure
represents a 200% increase since 1970. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS SERIES P-20,
No. 365, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1980, at 4-5 (1981).
4. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(d). See generally Atkinsson v. Kern County
Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89,96-98, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375,379-81 (1976).
5. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §23955(e).
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§7000-7021 (Uniform Parentage Act).
7. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,557 P.2d 106,134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
8. See generally Comment, Loss of Consortium and Unmarried Cohabitors: An Ex-
amination of Tong v. Jocson, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 133, 139-42 (1980).
9. See infra notes 67-101 and accompanying text. For purposes of this comment
the term "emotional distress" or "mental distress" encompasses the following definition:
[M]ental anguish: When connected with a physical injury, this term includes both
the resultant mental sensation of pain and also the accompanying feelings of dis-
tress, fright, and anxiety. In other connections, and as a ground for divorce or for
damages or an element of damages, it includes the mental suffering resulting from
the excitation of the more poignant and painful emotions, such as grief, severe dis-
appointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, public humiliation, despair, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
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bystander"° who suffers emotional distress from observing another's phys-
ical injury by a negligent tortfeasor must share a sufficiently close rela-
tionship with theprimary victimt" to come within the definition of a
foreseeable plaintiff. 2 The judicial requirement of a sufficiently close re-
lationship between the bystanderplaintiffand theprimary victim has been
held to be absent when the bystander is the housemate13 of the other in-
jured party.4 On the other hand, the requirement of a sufficiently close re-
lationship has been satisfied when the bystander plaintiff has proved the
existence of a spousal 5 or blood relationship 16 with the primary victim.
The California Supreme Court has yet to determine specifically whether
unmarried cohabitants have a right to state a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The possibility ofjudicial extension of the
negligent infliction of emotional distress remedy to unmarried cohabi-
tants, therefore, has not been foreclosed.
Recently, a California court of appeal recognized the right of an unmar-
ried cohabitant to sue for loss of consortium 7 when her housemate of
eleven and one-half years was negligently injured by a motorist. 8 Prior to
that case, the right to state a cause of action for loss of consortium was lim-
ited to married couples. 19 The court noted that many unmarried cohabi-
10. This comment uses the terms "bystander" or "bystander plaintiff" to refer to a
person who suffers emotional distress as a result of witnessing, or learning about, an injury
to another.
11. This comment uses the term "primary victim" to refer to the person who is ini-
tially injured by the defendant's tortious conduct.
12. SeeDillonv. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d728,740-41,441 P.2d 912,920,69 Cal. Rptr. 72,80
(1968).
13. This comment uses the term "housemate" or "unmarried cohabitant" to refer
to a person, regardless of his or her sexual preference, who chooses to share a spousal rela-
tionship without the formality of a legally recognized marriage ceremony. Underlying
motivations for adopting this lifestyle include (1) a desire to avoid the sex-stereotyped allo-
cation of roles associated with marriage; (2) a belief that marriage is unnecessary or irrele-
vant if no children are involved; (3) a reluctance to enter a supposedly permanent marriage;
(4) a bohemian philosophy; (5) a conscientious objection to state regulation of marriage;
(6) a desire to avoid the possible expense and trauma of a divorce; (7) an indifferent outlook
on legally sanctioned relationships; and (8) legal obstacles preventing marriage as in the
case of same-sex marriages. See Meade, Consortium Rights of the Unmarried: Time for a
Reappraisal, 15 FAM. L. Q. 223,233 (1981-82).
14. See, e.g., Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555,168 Cal. Rptr. 65(1980).
15. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253,79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
16. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59,562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
17. Loss of consortium traditionally has been defined as the rights of a spouse to
conjugal felicity. The elements of that felicity include love, companionship, affection, soci-
ety, comfort, solace, sexual relations, and services. See Comment, supra note 8, at 135.
18. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 58,188 Cal. Rptr. at 503(1983).
19. The right of a married woman to recover for loss of consortium resulting from
injuries to her husband was first recognized in Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.
3d 382,525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). Subsequent cases, however, refused to ex-
pand the cause of action. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977) (denying relief to the child of an injured parent); Baxter v. Supe-
rior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461,563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (denying relief to the par-
ent of an injured child); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977)
(denying relief to the fiancee of an injured man). See also Etienne v. DKM Enterprises, Inc.,
136 Cal. App. 3d 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1982) (denying relief to fiancee of an injured
man); Liedingv. Commercial Diving Center, 143 Cal. App. 3d 72, 191 Cal. Rptr. 559(1983)
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tants share a relationship which possesses every characteristic of the
spousal relationship except formalization and thus, when one of the co-
habitants is injured, the other partner is deserving of relief." The suffering
of an unmarried cohabitant may be no less real in a cause of action for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress than in a cause of action for loss of
consortium. In either case, one cohabitant suffers emotional trauma be-
cause of the serious injury or death of the other cohabitant.2'
Decisions that premise recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress on the presence of a familial relationship between the bystander
plaintiff and the primary victim may produce harsh results.2" This author
will argue that the California judiciary should expand the definition of a
"sufficiently close relationship" to include spousal-like cohabitation rela-
tionships, and thereby recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress for unmarried cohabitants. An overview of the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress first will be presented. This
overview will include a discussion of social policy concerns which limit a
plaintiff's right to relief, an analysis of the types of situations in which a
defendant will be held liable for emotional distress, and the application of
appropriate foreseeability standards to each of those situations. Argu-
ments then will be presented for the extension of the negligent infliction of
emotional distress action to unmarried cohabitants. An analysis of Dillon
v. Legg23 and Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals4 will demonstrate
that the California Supreme Court has not precluded unmarried cohabi-
tants from maintaining an action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. An analogy then will be drawn between a plaintiff's cause of action
for loss of consortium and an action for negligent infliction of emotional
(distinguishing Butcher); Hendrix v. General Motors Corp., 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 922 (1983) (rejecting Butcher's recognition of an unmarried cohabitant's right to a
loss of consortium action).
Two federal district courts purporting to predict how the state courts would rule per-
mitted a cause of action for loss of consortium by a plaintiff who was not married at the time
of the accident. See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980); Sutherland
v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Company, 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Two subse-
quent New Jersey cases declined to follow Bulloch. See Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141
(N.J. Super. 1982); Leonardis v. Morton Chemical Co., 445 A.2d 45 (N.J. Super. 1982). The
Sutherlandcase has been criticized because of its failure to follow earlier Pennsylvania state
court decisions. See Sostock v. Reiss, 415 N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. App. 1980); Sawyer v. Bailey,
413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980); see als6 Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 445 F. Supp. 168
(D. Minn. 1978); Childers, 444 A.2d 1141. With the exception of Butcher, no other state
court has allowed an unmarried cohabitant to state a claim for loss of consortium. See
Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1980); Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa
1983); Angeletv. Shivar, 602 S.W.2d 185 (Ken. 1980); Sostock,415 N.E.2d at 1094; Sawyer,
413 A.2d 165; Childers, 444 A.2d at 1141; Leonardis, 445 A.2d 45; Rademacher v. Torben-
sen, 13 N.Y.S.2d 124 (N.Y. App. 1939); Booth v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 87 S.E. 84 (W. Va.
1915).
20. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11.
21. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Drew, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
23. 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
24. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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distress. This comparison will show that social policy issues concerning
the expansion of each cause of action to include unmarried cohabitants
are similar. The discussion will continue with an analysis of the recent
California appellate court decisions of Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange
County25 and Hendrix v. General Motors Corp.26 These two decisions rep-
resent a split of authority over the rights of unmarried cohabitants to a
claim for loss of consortium. A careful appraisal of the two cases will indi-
cate that the debate over the scope of a defendant's duty presented in
Butcher and Hendrix also exists in the field of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. The author will conclude that the arguments in Butcher
favoring the extension of a remedy for loss of consortium to unmarried co-
habitants support the thesis that unmarried cohabitants should be able to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
This comment also will propose that homosexual couples27 be included
within the definitional framework of unmarried cohabitants. A couple's
sexual preference does not preclude the couple from forming a sufficiently
close relationship even though state legislatures refuse to recognize same-
sex marriages.28 Homosexual couples who can prove a relationship equiv-
alent to a spousal relationship should be able to maintain a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The following section briefly
will trace the development of the social policies and the law governing lia-
bility for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. SocialPolicy Concerns
Courts grant recovery for mental distress when the injury to the plain-
tiff stems from a defendant's intentional or extremely reckless conduct.
29
Recovery also is available in the form of parasitic damages when the de-
fendant commits a tort such as battery, slander, or false imprisonment,
which causes mental injury to the plaintiff.30 Courts, however, initially
25. 133 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983).
26. 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983).
27. "[H]omosexual: One, especially a male, whose desire for sexual relations is di-
rected to a person of the same sex." BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 566 (3d ed. 1969).
"[H]omosexuality: atypical sexuality characterized by manifestations of sexual desire to-
ward a member of one's own sex." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1085 (1976). The term "homosexual couple" or "homosexual cohabitants" as used in this
comment will apply to persons of both sexes.
28. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d
282 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 commentj (1965).
30. Rodriques v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (Hawaii 1970); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §47 comment b (1965).
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were reluctant to recognize that individuals have a duty not to disrupt
negligently the emotional tranquility of others."
Judicial reluctance to recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress was based on three main social policy concerns.3 2 First,
courts were hesitant to grant relief for emotional distress because the in-
jury seemed too speculative to be capable of measurement.3 3 Subsequent
advancements in the field of psychology have sufficiently established that
emotional distress is a real and measurable injury.34 Second, thejudiciary
was concerned that the courts would be flooded with fictitious claims if a
remedy for negligent infliction of emotional distress were recognized.35
The floodgate theory prompted the third concern of exposing defendants
to potentially unlimited liability.36 Subsequent court decisions have criti-
cized the barring of all actions for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress out of the fear that some fraudulent claims might escape detection.
37
The decisions of these courts hold that the interests of a meritorious claim
should prevail over alleged administrative difficulties. 8 To allay concerns
about the scope of the defendant's duty, courts have formulated various
tests by which the defendant's liability could be limited.39 California ap-
pears to have adopted two rules that define the scope of a defendant's duty
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.' To clarify the issues in-
volved in the application of these rules, the situations in which a defen-
dant will be liable for mental injury must be distinguished.41
B. Situations Creating an Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress
A defendant's tortious conduct will give rise to a cause of action for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress in two types of situations. The first
involves a situation in which the defendant's negligent conduct may sub-
ject other persons to a risk of physical harm. The persons subjected to or
witnessing the physical harm consequently may suffer serious mental dis-
31. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 327 (4th ed.
1971).
32. Id
33. Id. at 329.
34. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917,933, 122 Cal. Rptr.
470,481 (1975); PROSSER, supra note 31, at 328.
35. See id.
36. See Jarchow, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 934,122 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
37. See id; Tobinv. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419,422 (N.Y. 1969).
38. Dillon, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. See
generally PROSSER, supra note 31, at 327-28.
39. See infra notes 50-78 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 67-97 and accompanying text.
41. See Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California Expands Li-
abilityfor Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 291,293 (1981).
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tress and accompanying physical injury.42 An example of this situation is
a negligent motorist whose careless operation of an automobile places
others in fear for their own safety or the safety of an accompanying family
member.
43
A defendant also may be liable for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress when his conduct primarily creates a risk of causing mental harm.
The plaintiff in this second situation is neither subjected to a threat of
physical harm, nor a witness to another's injury although physical symp-
toms may result from the mental harm inflicted by the defendant. This sit-
uation is exemplified by a physician's negligent misdiagnosis of syphilis
which causes the patient and his or her spouse to suspect each other's infi-
delity and to suffer emotional distress as a result of the suspicions.44
The distinction between physical risk and mental risk situations is im-
portant because the courts have applied different criteria in assessing the
defendant's liability depending upon the situation creating the harm.45
The following section will discuss the applicable laws for determining lia-
bility in a physical risk and a mental risk situation. In keeping with the fo-
cus of th comment, the discussion will be limited to a defendant's duty to
a plaintiff who has suffered emotional harm arising from witnessing or
learning about an injury to another party.
C. Determining the Defendant's Duty in a Physical Risk Situation
Traditionally, courts have been more reluctant to allow a plaintiff a
remedy for emotional distress that arises out of a defendant's tortious
conduct toward another person than in situations in which the plaintiff
alone is injured.4' Judicial concern over fictitious claims of emotional dis-
tress and unlimited liability is even greater when the plaintiff is not the
primary victim of the defendant's negligent conduct.47 To guarantee the
genuineness of the plaintiff's emotional distress claim, most courts re-
quire that the plaintiff prove the emotional harm was accompanied by, or
produced, a physical illness or an injury.48 One of two standards of recov-
42. Physical injuries may result either from a force set in motion by the defendant
or as a consequence of the mental distress. Id at 293 n. 17.
43. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
44. See, e.g., Molienv. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813,167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980).
45. See Comment, supra note 41, at 293.
46. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295,314-15,379 P.2d
513,524-25,29 Cal. Rptr. 33,44-45 (1963).
47. Idt
48. Some courts have granted a remedy for physical illness or injury caused by a de-
fendant's conduct which resulted in an impact upon the plaintiff that had no real relation to
the emotional injury. See Porter v. Delaware L. & W.R. Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (dust in
eyes); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (inhalation of smoke); Hess v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 56 A.2d 89 (Pa. 1948) (electronic shock).
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ery is employed by a majority of jurisdictions: the impact rule49 or the
zone of danger rule. California and a few other states have rejected both
of these standards because the rules often produced anomalous results. 1
1.. The Impact Rule
In claims of emotional distress resulting from physical harm to another
person, the plaintiff typically is a bystander-witness to an accident. A mi-
nority of jurisdictions requires that the plaintiff not only prove the exis-
tence of a physical injury, but that the defendant's negligent conduct
caused a physical impact to the plaintiff.5" Courts adhering to this stan-
dard of recovery justify the rule on the theory that the plaintiff's claim is
more likely to be valid when impact occurs than when it does not. 3 Critics
of the impact rule assert that while the rule may bejustified when a serious
impact occurs, little guarantee of genuineness exists when the impact is in-
significant.54 The majority of jurisdictions rejects the impact rule and
adopts a standard of recovery that provides a remedy when the defendant
49. The followingjurisdictions allow recovery under the impact rule: Arizona: Val-
ley Natl Bank v. Brown, 517 P.2d 1256, 1261 (1974); Arkansas: St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.1R v.
Bragg, 64 S.W. 226,226-27 (1901); Florida: Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d
816,819 (1977); Illinois: Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657,659 (1898); Indiana: Kalen v. Terre
Haute & I.1R., 47 N.E. 694,695 (1897); Kentucky: Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v.
Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272,275 (1929); Nevada: Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton,
71 P.2d 1051, 1056 (1937); Ohio: Heid v. Red Malcuit Inc., 230 N.E. 2d 674,676 (1967).
50. The following jurisdictions allow recovery under the zone of danger rule. Some
of the jurisdictions listed below refer to the rule as the manifest injury rule: Colorado:
Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163,1164-65 (1978); Delaware: Robbv. Pennsylvania R.R.,
210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (1965); Georgia: Williamson v. Central Ga. Ry., 56 S.E. 119, 122
(1906); Idaho: Summers v. Western Idaho Potato Processing Co., 479 P.2d 292,293 (1970);
Iowa: Watson v. Dilts, 89 N.W. 1068, 1069 (1902); Kansas: Whitsel v. Watts, 159 P. 401,
402 (1916); Maryland: Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923, 926-27 (1951); Minnesota: Purcell
v. St. Paul City Ry., 50 N.W. 1034, 1034 (1892); Mississippi: First Nat'l Bank v. Langley,
314 So. 2d 324,339 (Miss. 1975); Montana: Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 P.2d 862,865-
66 (1934); Nebraska: Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 203 N.W. 643,649-50 (1925); New
Jersey: Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965); New Mexico: Higgins v. Hermes, 552
P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 558 P.2d 620 (1976); New York: Battalla v. State,
176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1961); North Carolina: Kimberly v. Howland, 55 S.E. 778, 780-81
(1906); North Dakota: Wilsonv. Northern Pac. Ry., 153 N.W. 429,431 (1915); Oklahoma:
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Keiffer, 150 P. 1026, 1028 (1915); Oregon: Salmi v. Columbia &
N.R.., 146 P. 819, 821 (1915); South Carolina: Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co., 160 S.E.2d
528,530 (1968); South Dakota: Sternhagen v. Kozel, 167 N.W. 398,399 (1918); Tennessee:
Trent v. Barrows, 397 S.W.2d 409,411 (1965); Vermont: Savard v. Codey Chevrolet, Inc.,
234 A.2d 656,660 (1967); West Virginia: Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S.E. 244,249-50 (1924);
Wisconsin: Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497,501 (1935).
51. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Otherjuris-
dictions following the lead of California are: Connecticut: D'Amicol v. Alverez Shipping
Co., 32 A.2d 129 (1973); Hawaii: Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 728 (1974); Massachusetts:
Dzionski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Michigan: Toms v. McConnell, 207
N.W.2d 140 (1973); New Hampshire: Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Pennsylvania:
Sinn v. Burd, 404A.2d 672 (1979); Rhode Island: D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524
(1975); Texas: Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Virginia: Hughes
v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Washington: Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 331.
54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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subjects the plaintiff to a high risk of physical impact.55
2. The Zone of Danger Rule
The zone of danger rule expands the types of situations in which a
plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.56 Ac-
cording to this theory of recovery, a defendant is liable to those plaintiffs
close enough in proximity to the defendant's tortious conduct reasonably
to fear injury, if those plaintiffs actually suffer some form of physical
symptom from this fear.57 Courts adopting the zone of danger rule realize
that the plaintiffs emotional distress can result from a fear for his or her
own personal safety as well as from a physical impact.5 8 The zone of dan-
ger rule, however, has led to harsh results. InAmaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and
Supply Co.,59 a mother witnessed a truck run over her child, but was denied
recovery because, at the time of the accident, the mother was not in fear
for her own life.6" Realizing that mental distress resulting from witnessing
the injury of a close relative might be as valid as that occurring from fear
for personal safety, the California Supreme Court rejected the zone of
danger rule.61
3. Dillon v. Legg
In Dillon v. Legg,62 the California Supreme Court extended the defen-
dant's liability beyond the limits established in the zone of danger rule.63
The Dillon plaintiff-mother suffered a physical injury resulting from the
emotional trauma of witnessing the defendant negligently kill her daugh-
ter.' Despite the mother's physical injury, the trial court found the defen-
dant not liable for the mother's emotional distress because the woman was
not in danger of physical harm at the time of the accident. 65 In reversing
the lower court, the California Supreme Court reasoned that both the im-
pact rule and zone of danger rule established artificial standards for as-
sessing a defendant's liability.' The salient point in determining the scope
55. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
57. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
58. I1
59. 59 Cal. 2d 295,379 P.2d 513,29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
60. See i at 298-302,304-06,379 P.2d at 514-16,518-19,29 Cal. Rptr. at 34-36,38-39.
61. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 733,441 P.2d at 915-16,69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
62. 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
63. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
64. See Dillon at 732,441 P.2d at 914,69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
65. See iL at 732,441 P.2d at 915,69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
66. See id at 746-47,441 P.2d at 925,69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
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of a defendant's duty of due care to others is the foreseeability of the risk
of harm from the defendant's negligent act.' Reviewing the facts in Dil-
lon, the court found that the defendant reasonably should have foreseen
that an infant would be accompanied by a parent and that the parent
would suffer emotional distress upon seeing the child killed. 8
In order to prevent the defendant from being exposed to unlimited lia-
bility to those persons who might suffer emotional and physical harm
from observing the defendant's tortious conduct, the California Supreme
Court set forth guidelines to assist courts in determining the scope of the
defendant's liability.69 The Dillon court considered three factors relevant
in determining whether the risk of emotional distress to a bystander plain-
tiff is foreseeable: (1) whether the plaintiff is located near the scene of the
accident, (2) whether the plaintiff's emotional distress manifested by a
physical injury results from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident, and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim are
closely related.7" The Dillon decision indicates that these guidelines are
not to be applied rigidly.71 The court cautioned that future determinations
of a defendant's duty will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.72 All
the circumstances must be analyzed before a court can conclude what the
ordinary person in a similar situation reasonably should have foreseen. 3
The criteria for determining a defendant's liability under the Dillon rule
apply to situations involving primarily a physical risk.74 A defendant who
negligently subjects another to a threat of mental distress devoid of physi-
cal risk is held liable under a different standard.75 The following section
will discuss the applicable laws for determining the scope of a defendant's
duty in a mental risk situation.
D. Determining the Defendant's Duty in a Mental Risk Situation
Most courts deny recovery for emotional distress in situations in which
the defendant's conduct primarily creates a risk of causing mental harm
because of the inherent difficulties in proving the validity of the claim.76
Courts have allowed recovery, however, for mental distress absent a phys-
67. See id at 740-41,441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
68. Seeid at 741, 441 P.2d at 921,69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
69. See id at 740-41,441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
70. See id
71. See id at740-41, 441 P.2d at920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
72. See id
73. See id
74. See id at 740,441 P.2d at 920,69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
75. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
76. See PROSSER, supra note 31, at 328-30.
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ical injury when a telegram has been negligently transmitted" or a corpse
has been negligently handled." The uniquely tragic circumstances of each
situation serve as a guarantee that the claim for emotional distress is valid
without the proof of an accompanying physical injury.
79
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,80 the California Supreme
Court joined the few jurisdictions that have recognized an independent
cause of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress absent
the presence of a physical injury.8" The plaintiff husband in Molien
brought an action against a hospital and a doctor, alleging negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress after his wife had been misdiagnosed as hav-
ing contracted syphilis.82 Mr. Molien alleged that his wife was instructed
to inform him of the diagnosis so that he could undergo blood tests to as-
certain whether he also had syphilis and was the source of his wife's pur-
ported infection.83 The incident led to marital discord and the initiation of
dissolution proceedings.84 The trial court dismissed the cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress because the husband did not suf-
fer a physical injury. 5 He also was not present during his wife's examina-
tion and, therefore, did not come within the definition of a foreseeable
bystander plaintiff according to Dillon.86 The California Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal on the grounds that Mr. Molien was not a by-
stander plaintiff but a direct victim of the defendant's negligent conduct.8
An erroneous diagnosis of syphilis, the court reasoned, foreseeably would
cause marital discord.88 Since the negligent conduct was directed at Mr.
Molien as well as his wife, the doctor had a duty to use care in his diagnosis
77. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 36 So. 517 (1903); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Redding, 129 So. 743 (1930).
78. SeeCheliniv.Niere, 32 Cal. 2d480,196 P.2d 915(1948); Careyv.Lima, Salmon
& Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959).
79. See Rodriques v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); see also PROSSEM, supra note 31, at
330.
80. 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
81. Thesejurisdictions are: California: Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d
916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1980); Hawaii: Rodriques v. State, 472 P.2d 509
(1970); Maine: Culburt v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (1982). Five other
states now recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort.
These jurisdictions are: Alabama: Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369
(1981); Connecticut: Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180 (1978);
Louisiana: Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Mis-
souri: Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (1983); Washington: Hunsleyv. Giard, 553 P.2d
1096(1976).
82. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 919,616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The husband
also alleged loss of consortium. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress but failed to dismiss the action for loss of consortium. The
California Supreme Court considered this an oversight and amended the dismissal to apply
to both causes of action. Id at 921,616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
83. Id. at 919,616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
84. Id at 920,616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
85. Seeid
86. See id at 921-23,616 P.2d at 815-17,167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-35.
87. See id at 922-23,616 P.2d at 816,167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
88. See id at 923,616 P.2d at 817,167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
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of the plaintiff's wife.89
Application of the Dillon foreseeability guidelines, ,consequently, ap-
pears to limit a defendant's liability only to percipient witnesses in a phys-
ical risk situation after Molien.90 In a mental risk situation, the court
applies general principles of foreseeability to limit a defendant's liabil-
ity.91 The duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress is breached when a reasonable person would be unable to cope with
the serious mental stress engendered by the circumstances. 92 The stan-
dard of recovery under Molien is based on determinations (1) whether the
defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care because the plaintiff's injury
reasonably was foreseeable to the defendant, (2) whether the plaintiff suf-
fered serious emotional distress as a result of the defendant's tortious con-
duct, and (3) whether the plaintiff can produce evidence of a medically
significant nature indicating serious emotional distress, or can establish
"some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case." 93
As revealed in the above section, California is one of a fewjurisdictions
that recognize an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress absent a physical injury.94 According to Molien, the
plaintiff will have to prove the defendant breached his duty by applying
general rules of foreseeability. 95 In addition, the plaintiff will have to es-
tablish the presence of serious emotional distress by producing evidence
of a significant medical nature or by proving the genuineness in the cir-
cumstances of the case.96 The following section will analyze Dillon and
Molien and conclude that unmarried cohabitants are not precluded from
being considered foreseeable plaintiffs in either a physical risk or a mental
risk situation.
EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO UNMARRIED
COHABITANTS
A. Dillon v. Legg: The Physical Risk Situation
As previously noted, a percipient witness to another's injury in a physi-
cal risk situation must come within the definition of a foreseeable plaintiff
to recover for emotional distress.97 Since the Molien decision did not over-
89. See ia
90. See id. at 921-23,616 P.2d at 815-17,167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-35.
91. Seeid. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
92. Seeid. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20,167 Cal Rptr. at 837-38.
93. See Comment, supra note 41, at 300-01.
94. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
95. Seesupra note 91 and accompanying text.
96. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
97. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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rule Dillon,98 a bystander plaintiff will have to prove the defendant's duty
of due care according to the Dillon foreseeability guidelines. The factors
relevant in determining whether the risk of emotional distress to a by-
stander plaintiff is reasonably foreseeable are: (1) whether the plaintiff is
located near the scene of the accident, (2) whether plaintiff's emotional
distress results from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim are closely related.99
In addition, the plaintiff may also have to prove that the emotional dis-
tress resulted in a physical injury since Molien abolished the physical in-
jury requirement only when the plaintiff was defined as a direct victim.1M
Implicit in the Dillon decision is the mandate of the court that the fore-
seeability guidelines be applied on a case-by-case basis.' This language
implies that the court wanted to avoid setting forth a rigid standard for de-
termining a defendant's duty to bystander plaintiffs. 102 The court cau-
tioned, however, that the defendant's liability should not extend to the
"remote and unexpected." 0 3 Recognizing that a liberal application of the
Dillon factors would subject the defendant to unlimited liability, subse-
quent decisions by the California courts of appeal have granted recovery
only when all three Dillon factors are present.'14
An unmarried cohabitant who witnesses the injury of his or her house-
mate, therefore, would have to comply with the three-pronged test set
forth in Dillon."5 In particular, the cohabitant would have to prove the ex-
istence of a close relationship with the primary victim. One California
court of appeal has refused to grant the Dillon close relationship status to
cohabitants.0 6
In Drew v. Drake,"0 7 the plaintiff alleged that she suffered emotional
distress upon observing her "de facto"'0 8 spouse of three years killed in an
automobile collision negligently caused by the defendant." 9 The Drew
court denied recovery on the grounds that the bystander plaintiff and pri-
98. Seesupra note 90 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
100. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928,616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
101. Seesupra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
102. Mat
103. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at741,441 P.2d at 921,69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
104. See Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977); Powers
v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865,114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974). Followingjurisdictions that have
interpreted the first twoDillon factors narrowly, two recent Califorma appellate court deci-
sions have construed the Dillon close relationship factor strictly. See Kately v. Wilkinson,
148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983) (relationship akin to family relationship be-
cause of friendship and past associations does not satisfy third Dillon factor); Trapp v.
Schuyler Constructions dba Regent Apts. 149 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1983)
(refusing to extend the third Dillon factor to include first cousins).
105. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
106. See Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555,168 Cal. Rptr. 65(1980).
107. lod
108. Id at 557,168 Cal. Rptr. 65.
109. ld
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mary victim did not satisfy the close relationship requirement set forth in
Dillon.1"' Noting that spousal' and parental"' relationships have been
held to satisfy the Dillon guideline, Drew refused to provide relief to a
plaintiff who did not share a familial bond with the primary victim. 13 The
court reasoned that allowing cohabitants to recover would be an unrea-
sonable extension of the defendant's scope of duty and contrary to the in-
tent expressed in Dillon.
114
The Drew decision unnecessarily limits recovery to those bystander
plaintiffs who share a spousal or blood relationship with the primary vic-
tim,115 despite the clear recommendation of the Dillon court that the crite-
ria for establishing foreseeability be applied on a case-by-case basis.1 6
Depending upon the particular circumstances of each case, Dillon sug-
gests that the foreseeability guidelines might be given different weight and
even replaced with more relevant factors." 7 Furthermore, Dillon does not
precisely define the scope of a sufficiently close relationship.118 The deci-
sion indicates only that a bystander who has no relationship with the pri-
mary victim, or who has only a distant relationship with that party, will be
unable to recover.119 The court, therefore, only precludes relief for mental
injury to those bystanders who have not formed any real and significant
emotional bond with the primary victim.' This language allows for a de-
gree of flexibility in determining the type of relationship which will satisfy
the Dillon foreseeability close relationship guideline.
Another California appellate court has provided a more flexible inter-
pretation of the close relationship guideline than that found in Drew.121 In
Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California,122 a foster mother was al-
lowed to recover for her emotional distress after observing the defendant
negligently administer a fatal dose of glucose solution to her foster
child.123 The court found that while the relationship of biological parent
and child did not exist, the emotional bond between Mrs. Mobaldi and
110. Id at 557-58, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
11I. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1977).
112. See, e.g., Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1969).
113. SeeDrew, 11OCal.App. 3dat558,168 Cal. Rptr. at66.
114. Seeid. at557, 168 Cal. Rptr. at66.
115. Seeid at558,168 Cal. Rptr. at66.
116. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740,441 P.2d at 920,69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.




121. See Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1976); accord Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758,766 (Hawaii 1974) (recovery by plain-
tiff for witnessing death of step-grandmother).
122. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
123. Seeid at578, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
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her foster child possessed all the incidents of a parent-child relationship
"except those flowing as a matter of law."' 2 Mobaldi further noted that
the Dillon guidelines seemingly do not limit the scopeof the close relation-
ship requirement to one of blood, marriage, or adoption. 25 A strong emo-
tional attachment similar to a familial relationship could satisfy the Dillon
guideline.126 Given the facts of Mobaldi, the court concluded that the
child's foster parents more likely would suffer emotional trauma from ob-
serving the boy's injury and death than would the boy's biological parents
who had abandoned him. 1
27
The extension of the defendant's duty of due care to persons who share
a "family like" relationship with the primary victim does not contradict
the foreseeability guideline of Dillon, as the Drew decision implies.128 The
purpose of the close relationship guideline set forth in Dillon is to screen
out insignificant or erroneous claims of emotional distress. 12 9 A familial
relationship is a means of guaranteeing that the distress claimed is real. 3
As Mobaldi indicates, however, the emotional attachments of a family re-
lationship, and not legal status, are the attachments that are relevant to
foreseeability.'"I SinceDillon has been held to encompass parental-like re-
lationships, 13 2 an argument may be made that the guidelines also should
encompass spousal-like relationships.
An example of a spousal-like relationship is the relationship that is of-
ten found to exist between unmarried cohabitants. Particularly if the rela-
tionship has been long lasting, an unmarried cohabitant likely will suffer
serious emotional distress from witnessing the injury or death of the other
cohabitant. The dramatic increase in the number of couples choosing to
cohabit certainly removes this type of relationship from what Dillon
termed the remote and unexpected.' 34 In 1980, over 1,500,000 unmarried
heterosexual couples shared a household. 135 This represents a 200% in-
crease since 1970.136 Many cohabitation arrangements closely resemble
the traditional family unit. 37 Twenty-seven percent of the cohabiting
124. See id. at 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
125. See id at582, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
126. See id
127. See id
128. SeeDrew, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 557,168 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
129. SeeDillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741,441 P.2d at 921,69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
130. Seeid
131. Mobaldi, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 582, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
132. See id
133. See Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 58, 67, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 503,510 (1983).
134. SeeDillon, 68 Cal. 2d at741,441 P.2d at921,69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
135. Seesupra note 3 and accompanying text.
136. Id
137. See generally Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspec-
tive, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1125, 1128-37 (1981).
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couples in 1980 had children living with them.'38 The few studies that have
been made concerning cohabitants indicate that these couples exhibit ec-
onomic behavior generally associated with married persons.
13 9
Along with an increase in the number of couples choosing to cohabit, a
marked increase has occurred in the rate of divorce in the United States. 140
Since 1970 the divorce rate has climbed from 47 to 109 divorced persons
per 1,000 married persons.141 Given these profound social changes during
the last two decades, a narrow interpretation of the basic family unit
would not reflect the realities of contemporary society.
In recognition of the changing family structure and increase in spousal-
like cohabitation, the California Legislature and judiciary have reformed
many laws that discriminated on the basis of marital status.14 Section
12955 of the California Government Code makes discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, or marital sta-
tus illegal. 143 This code section was applied by the California court of ap-
peal in Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority,'" which held that the
statute prohibited unmarried, low-income housing tenants from being
evicted for living with a person of the opposite sex. 145 Section 12955141 also
prohibits financial institutions from using a person's marital status as a
basis in evaluating a credit application. Furthermore, the California Leg-
islature has repealed sections 269a and 269b of the California Penal
Code, 147 which made cohabitation and adultery misdemeanors.
In Marvin v. Marvin, "I the California Supreme Court recognized that
contemporary social mores were changing radically and that unmarried
cohabitants should have access to the legal system to settle their dis-
putes. 149 The Marvin court held that express contracts between unmarried
cohabitants regarding property rights are enforceable. 5' A basis for equi-
table relief in the absence of an express contract also was recognized by
the court. 51
Legal recognition afforded unmarried cohabitants by the Legislature
and the courts reflects the growing awareness and acceptance of alterna-
138. Seeid at1129.
139. Seeidat1139.
140. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC SERIES P-20 No. 372, MARITAL STATUS AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1981 at 1(1982).
141. Id
142. Seesupra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
143. Seesupra note4 and accompanying text.
144. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
145. Seeid at96, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
146. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
147. CAL. PENAL CODE §§269a-269b (repealed 1975).
148. 18 Cal. 3d 660,557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
149. Id at 683-84, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
150. Id at 665,557 P.2d at 134, 134 Cal. Rptr. 819.
151. Id
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tive lifestyles by contemporary society.12 Certainly, the values underlying
the interest of the state in marriage are important and universally fa-
vored. 53 The conclusion that these values only will exist in a legally sanc-
tioned marital framework, however, is doubtful given the rapid changes
occurring in the family unit.'54
The foregoing analysis of Dillon has noted that one criterion for deter-
mining whether a bystander plaintiff is a foreseeable victim of defendant's
negligent act is evidence of a sufficiently close relationship between the
plaintiff and primary victim. 55 Dillon allows courts flexibility in inter-
preting the scope of the close relationship standard.'56 Considering the
prevalence of spousal-like relationships'57 and the resulting legal recogni-
tion of cohabitant's rights,158 this author proposes that the foreseeability
guidelines of Dillon do not preclude unmarried cohabitants from a rem-
edy for emotional distress in a physical risk situation.
The defendant also should be prevented from claiming an absence of
duty to unmarried cohabitants when defendant's tortious conduct places
the cohabitants primarily in fear of mental harm. In this instance, the de-
fendant's duty will be determined by the foreseeability standards in
Molien.59 The following section will discuss whether unmarried cohabi-
tants are precluded from an emotional distress remedy in a mental risk sit-
uation.
B. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: The MentalRisk Situation
In Molien, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can re-
cover for serious emotional distress absent physical harm if the injury was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and the plaintiff can prove seri-
ous emotional distress by the genuineness of the circumstances or by sig-
nificant medical evidence. 6° Extending the defendant's duty of due care
to unmarried cohabitants may be accomplished more easily in a mental
risk situation than one in which the risk of physical injury is paramount.
In the physical risk situation, a plaintiff must have suffered a physical in-
152. Seesupra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
153. SeeMarvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at684,557P.2d at 122,134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
154. Seesupra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
159. 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
160. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Jurisdictions have differed over the
scope of serious emotional distress. See Campbellv. Animal Quarantine Stations, 632 P.2d
1066 (Hawaii 1981) (allowing recovery for death of dog). But see Roman v. Carroll, 621
P.2d 307 (Ariz. 1980) (denying recovery for death of dog because the court held that the dog
was personal property).
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jury from the emotional distress and also satisfy the foreseeability factors
of Dillon which include the existence of a substantial relational interest
with the primary victim.16' The Molien standard of recovery, however, fo-
cuses more on whether the plaintiff actually suffers serious emotional dis-
tress' 62 rather than whether the injured plaintiff comes within an artificial
definition of a foreseeable victim.
163
Molien adopts a reasonable person standard to determine the scope of
the defendant's duty of due care.'" The jury must decide whether a rea-
sonable person in the defendant's position would have foreseen the plain-
tiffs injury.'65 Social policy concerns for limiting the defendant's liability,
however, still must be considered by the court.1 66 In Molien, the plaintiff
and his wife shared a physician-patient relationship with the defendant
doctor. 67 Similarly, a type of privity also existed between the plaintiffs
and defendants in the telegraph'68 and mortician cases. 169 While Molien
specifically does not require privity between the parties in order to find
that a reasonable person would have foreseen the plaintiff's injury, this re-
quirement would serve the purpose of protecting the defendant from un-
limited liability.170
The reasonable person standard also is applicable to plaintiff's burden
of proving injury and causation. 171 The genuineness of an emotional dis-
tress claim can be satisfied in two ways. 72 First, the plaintiff can meet the
burden of proving serious emotional injury by producing significant med-
ical evidence verifying the existence of the injury.73 Second, the plaintiff
may establish the genuineness of the claim by the special circumstances of
the case.174 In evaluating the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reaction and
the genuineness of the plaintiff's proof, thejury may grant relief if thejury
finds that a reasonable person would be unable to cope sufficiently with
the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. 75 Satisfy-
ing either method of proof should not pose an insurmountable task for an
unmarried cohabitant who has been placed in a mental risk situation by a
negligent tortfeasor, especially if the defendant holds a position of trust.
161. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
162. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
163. Seeid
164. See id at 923,616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
165. See id
166. See id at 930,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
167. See id at 919-20,616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. 832-33.
168. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
170. See Comment, supra note 41, at 307 n.107.
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The plaintiff in Molien, who was perceived as a direct victim, recovered
for emotional distress because of a foreseeable disruption of the marital
relationship.176 Similarly, a physician, cognizant of a spousal-like rela-
tionship between the patient and another person, reasonably should fore-
see that a misdiagnosis of syphilis, cancer, or other grave illness would
have a detrimental effect upon both cohabitants.77 Once the defendant's
duty to the unmarried cohabitants is established, the direct victim plain-
tiff in this situation would have to prove the existence and reasonableness
of the mental injury. 1
7 8
The previous discussion has demonstrated that neither the Dillon nor
Molien standards of recovery preclude an unmarried cohabitant from
stating a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when
his or her housemate is injured. Increased social awareness, if not accep-
tance, of the growing number of couples who choose to cohabit supports
the thesis that courts should not apply outmoded social policy concerns
that deny unmarried cohabitants a remedy in either a physical or mental
risk situation. 179 The following section will detail the social policy con-
cerns regarding the question of whether unmarried cohabitants should be
granted the right to a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. By
way of analogy, the author will present two conflicting opinions on the is-
sue of whether an unmarried cohabitant is entitled to an action for loss of
consortium when his or her partner is seriously injured. The torts of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium are, in many
ways, similar. A final resolution of the legal conflicts created by the two
cases will affect significantly the rights of unmarried cohabitants in the
area of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 80
Loss OF CONSORTIUM AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
Loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress are
similar causes of action because each provides the plaintiff with a means
176. See id at 923,616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
177. See Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After
Mollen v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179,191 n.100 (1981).
178. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
180. The two conflicting California appellate court cases are: Butcher v. Superior
Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983) and Hendrix v.
General Motors Corporation, et al., 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983). The
appellant in the Hendrix case filed an appeal after the adverse judgment. The California
Supreme Court granted a hearing in October 1983, but subsequently dismissed the appeal
on January 7, 1984, per stipulation after the parties in Hendrix agreed to an out-of-court
settlement. A resolution of the issue of whether unmarried cohabitants have a right to a
cause of action for loss of consortium, consequently, has been postponed.
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of relief for serious emotional injury. 8' The social policy arguments
against extending either cause of action to unmarried cohabitants are sim-
ilar. These arguments include the following: (1) the lack of precedent for
extending the cause of action to unmarried couples, (2) the injury to the
unmarried partner is too indirect, (3) the damages would be too specula-
tive, (4) the cause of action would be extended to other classes of plain-
tiffs, and (5) public policy favors marriage.182 The following section will
analyze a case which discredits these concerns and concludes that unmar-
ried couples have a right to a loss of consortium action.
A. Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County
A California appellate court in Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange
County, 83 recently held that none of the social policy concerns, as applied
to a loss of consortium action, outweighed the need for the defendant to.
redress the wrong perpetrated against the plaintiff.184 In Butcher, the
plaintiff's cohabitant of eleven and one-half years was negligently struck
by the defendant's car and seriously injured.185 At the time of the accident,
the unmarried couple had two children, filedj oint income tax returns, and
maintainedjoint savings and checking accounts.186 The couple referred to
and acknowledged each other as husband and wife although no legal mar-
riage ceremony had taken place.187 Upon learning that the plaintiffs were
not legally married, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the
claim for loss of consortium.188 The appellate court denied the defendant's
writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion for summary
judgment.'89
The defendant argued that a claim for loss of consortium could not be
stated by the plaintiff because the right to consortium is based on a legally
valid marriage.9 Furthermore, social policy dictates against expanding
the defendant's liability to unmarried couples. 1 Butcher acknowledged
that social policy had limited recovery for loss of consortium to the legally
married.9 2 The court, however, defined the tort of loss of consortium as
an interference with the continuation of a relational interest and con-
181. See supra notes 9, 17 and accompanying text.
182. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 62, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
183. 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983).
184. See id at 62-70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506-12.
185. See id. at 59-60, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05.





191. See id at62, 188 Cal. Rptr. at506.
192. Seeid.
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cluded that unmarried cohabitants also have a legitimate interest in the
continuation of their relationship. 1
93
In addressing the policy arguments against extending the tort remedy
to unmarried couples, the court initially refuted the theory that no prece-
dent existed for this action. 194 The court noted that the common law is not
a static body of laws, but is capable of adapting to changing times and is-
sues.' 95 The basis for a cause of action for loss of consortium, therefore,
had gradually changed from a proprietary entitlement vested in the hus-
band to one of a relational interest shared equally by both spouses. 196 This
judicial reformation of the tort action reflected the changing perception of
a woman's status in western society. 197 After a review of relevant case law,
the court concluded that no precedent existed that would prevent further
judicial revisions of the tort action to reflect the changing needs of soci-
ety.
198
The second policy argument which stated that the spouse of the physi-
cally injured victim suffers too indirect or too remote an injury also was
criticized in Butcher. 199 This argument, the court noted, originally was ad-
vanced to prevent a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium and has
been widely rejected by the courts.?° A severely disabling injury to one
spouse may not destroy the marital relationship, but the relationship will
invariably be altered in a tragic manner.21 The mental and emotional
anguish caused by observing a spouse turned into a helpless invalid is
neither an indirect nor a remote injury.20 2 Butcher reasoned that the suf-
fering of an unmarried cohabitant in a similar situation may be no less
real, direct, or foreseeable than that suffered by a spouse.2 3
The policy argument stating damages in a loss of consortium action
were too speculative was considered meritless by Butcher.201 Advances in
modem science provide sufficient evidence that a person, regardless of
marital status, may become severely disabled, mentally as well as physi-
cally, upon the death or injury of a loved one.205 Modem science has also
developed the ability to approximate the extent of mental suffering.20 6 On
the basis of this information, courts and juries have been able to award
193. Seeidat67,188Cal.Rptr.at510.
194. See id at 62-66, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506-09.
195. See id at 62-64, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
196. See id at61, 188 Cal. Rptr. at505.
197. See id.
198. See iL at 66, 188 Cal. Rptr. at509.





204. See id at 68-69, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
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206. See id
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damages for pain and suffering as well as for other noneconomic losses.2 7
The fourth policy issue concerned the fear that defendants would be ex-
posed to unlimited liability if the tort remedy were extended beyond the
marital relationship. 208 Butcher argued that this fear was unwarranted.20 9
If the unmarried cohabitants could prove a relational interest similar to
that shared by spouses, then the defendant would be liable only to the
partner of the physically injured cohabitant.
210
The final argument involved the concern that if unmarried cohabitants
were allowed loss of consortium, the interest of the state in fostering mar-
riage, as evidenced in the workers' compensation and wrongful death stat-
utes, would be undermined.2 1 'Butcher noted that the right to recover
under each of these laws is governed by statute while a cause of action for
loss of consortium developed out of the common law.212 Since the Califor-
nia Legislature has chosen not to define or regulate consortium rights by
statute,213 Butcher concluded that the mandates of both workers' compen-
sation and wrongful death statutes are inapplicable to the cause of action
for loss of consortium.2 4
After holding that the social policy against extending the right to a
cause of action for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants is no
longer justified, Butcher provided a standard whereby cohabitation rela-
tionships could be evaluated to determine whether a remedy should be af-
forded.215 Butcher noted that nonmarital cohabitation arrangements are
entered into for a variety of reasons and include relationships that range
from casual affairs to relationships that endure longer than many mar-
riages. 216 Permitting all unmarried cohabitants to recover for loss of con-
sortium, therefore, would pose severe problems in terms of limiting the
defendant's liability.217 Thus, the Butcher court recommended that only
unmarried cohabitants who can prove a stable and significant cohabita-
tion arrangement be included within the definition of a foreseeable plain-
207. See id
208. Seeid at69,188Cal. Rptr.at511.
209. See id
210. An injured person foreseeably has close friends and relatives who could be af-
fected by the injury. If these relationships were recognized, then the defendant's liability
would depend on the number of friends, children, or other relatives an injured person has,
without regard to the level of culpability. The sexual aspects of spousal and cohabitation
relationships distinguish them from the other types of relationships. The defendant's lia-
bility, therefore, would only be extended to the injured person's sexual partner who might
be either a spouse or spouse-like cohabitant. See id
211. See id at69-70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at511-12.
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tiff in a loss of consortium action.218
The guidelines presented in Butcher for use in evaluating the stability
and significance of a cohabitation arrangement include the following: (1)
the existence of a mutual contract, (2) the degree of economic cooperation
and entanglement, (3) the exclusivity of sexual relations, and (4) the exis-
tence of a "family relationship" with children.219
The preceding analysis of Butcher indicates that a person who negli-
gently injures an adult may reasonably foresee in our contemporary soci-
ety that the injured person may be cohabiting with another without the
formality of marriage.2" Policy arguments favoring the limitation of a de-
fendant's liability despite the foreseeable injury are no longer valid ac-
cording to Butcher.221 Finally, the court presents criteria for evaluating
cohabitation arrangements.22 Proof of these criteria enables the granting
of relief to those couples who have provided evidence of a significantly
close relationship.22 A contrary opinion regarding the right of unmarried
cohabitants to a loss of consortium action will be analyzed in the follow-
ing section.
B. Hendrix v. General Motors Corp. et al.
In Hendrix v. General Motors Corp. et al.,224 the plaintiffs, Lebron
Mitchell and Sharon Hendrix, joined in a complaint against General Mo-
tors Corporation and Doten Pontiac for damages arising out of an auto-
mobile accident in which Mitchell was severely injured.225 Mitchell stated
three causes of action for products liability and negligence; in the fourth
cause of action, Hendrix alleged loss of consortium. 226 Hendrix alleged
that she was the prospective wife of the plaintiff and had been residing
with Mitchell at the time of the accident. 7 The defendants demurred to
the fourth cause of action on the basis that a claim for loss of consortium
cannot be maintained if the plaintiff is not married to the injured party.22
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and en-





221. Seeid at62-70,188 Cal. Rptr. at506-12.
222. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
223. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
224. 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983).
225. See id at 297-98, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.
226. See id at 297, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.
227. See id at 297,193 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
228. See id
229. See id at 297-98, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.
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Outlining in great detail thejudicial and legislative support for the no-
tion that marriage is the basic unit of social order, the Hendrix court rea-
soned that this public policy would be thwarted if unmarried cohabitants
could gain marital legal rights without accepting the accompanying legal
responsibilities." Hendrix sharply disagreed with the Butcher decision.23
1
In particular, the Hendrix court advocated that the judiciary not attempt
to affect a change in public policy regarding the rights of cohabitants.
Only the legislature, which is responsible. to the electorate, should have
the power to institute radical changes of this nature.
2 32
Another point of contention between the two decisions is the Hendrix
appraisal of the Butcher criteria for establishing evidence of a stable and
significant relationship.233 Hendrix labeled the criteria unworkable.234
While married couples could prove their relationship by documentary ev-
idence, unmarried cohabitants would have to rely on more subjective evi-
dence.235 Numerous standards and difficulties would arise, placing an
unnecessary burden on thejudicial system. 36
The two appellate court decisions of Butcher and Hendrix obviously are
in sharp disagreement over the issue of whether to extend a remedy for
loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants.37 Butcher emphasizes the
need for the plaintiff to be compensated for the defendant's negligent act,
and holds that the plaintiff is a foreseeable victim who is owed a duty of
due care."8 Hendrix defines the defendant's duty according to prevalent
social policies, which the court refuses to override in order to provide a
remedy for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants. 239 The following
section will discuss the applicability of the two decisions to an emotional
distress action.
C. Application of Butcher and Hendrix to a Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Action
This author has indicated that a defendant in either a physical or
mental risk situation owes a duty of care to all persons who foreseeably are
endangered by his tortious conduct.2' As the Butcher court noted, the
likelihood that an injured adult will be married is no less than the likeli-
230. See id at 298-301, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 923-25.
231. See id at 298, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
232. See id at 301, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
233. See id at 301-02, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
234. See id
235. See id at 302, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
236. See id at 302, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
237. Seesupra notes 183-236 and accompanying text.
238. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 67-68, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11.
239. See Hendrix, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 299-300, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25.
240. See supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text.
Pacific LawJournal / Vol. 15
hood that a small child's mother personally will witness an injury to her
offspring.241 By parity of reasoning, the defendant also reasonably may
expect in our contemporary society that the injured adult may be an un-
married cohabitant and that his or her housemate will suffer emotional
distress by witnessing the injury.
In a physical risk situation, the plaintiff must suffer a physical injury
and satisfy the foreseeability guidelines of Dillon which include the exis-
tence of a substantially close relationship with the primary victim. 242
Courts that have interpreted Dillon flexibly have allowed recovery for
emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff who shares a "family-like" rela-
tionship with the primary victim. 4" A plaintiff who is able to prove the ex-
istence of a stable and significant spousal-like relationship with the
primary victim by use of the Butcher criteria should also satisfy the Dillon
requirement of a substantially close relationship.
A close relational interest between the direct victim and other injured
party is not specifically required in a mental risk situation.244 Evidence of
a serious mental injury, however, would be substantiated by proof of a
spousal-like relationship between the two injured parties.245 A defendant
who is in privity with the cohabitants and knows of the spousal-like rela-
tionship should reasonably conclude that his negligent conduct could re-
sult in plaintiffs injury.24
In either a physical risk or mental risk situation, the defendant's duty of
due care is limited by social policy.247 The Hendrix decision reflects the
opinion of courts that are concerned with a possible flood of fictitious liti-
gation and increasing administrative difficulties.248 If the task of provid-
ing unmarried cohabitants a remedy for loss of consortium were given to
the legislature, as the Hendrix decision suggests, the courts would be abdi-
cating judicial responsibility. Both loss of consortium and negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress actions are derived from common law.2 49
The judiciary, therefore, must use the traditions of common law to con-
struct an appropriate standard of recovery.2 0
Another concern expressed in Hendrix25 1 is the need to foster the basic
family unit. Granting a remedy to unmarried couples who suffer severe
emotional distress in either a physical or mental risk situation will not un-
241. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 67-68, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11.
242. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
245. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 67-68, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11.
246. Seesupra note 170 and accompanying text.
247. Seesupra note 180 and accompanying text.
248. SeeHendrix, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
249. SeeButcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
250. See id
251. See Hendrix, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 299-300,193 Cal. Rptr. 923-25.
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dermine the interest of the state in fostering the traditional family unit.
Clearly, the transitions taking place in western culture, as exemplified by
the changes in family structure, reflect a moral and social revolution that
will not be halted by ajudiciary insistent on adhering to an older moral-
ity.5 Furthermore, unlike the tort of loss of consortium, which is founded
on an interest in a marital relationship, 53 the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress merely requires that the injured parties share a sub-
stantially close relationship.54 Thus, the concern in Hendrix about the in-
terest of the state in protecting marital rights is not as great in an action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress as would be the case in an action
for loss of consortium.
Despite the Hendrix decision, the rationale for extending a loss of con-
sortium cause of action to unmarried cohabitants presented in Butcher
may still be relied upon as support for extending to unmarried cohabi-
tants the right to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Dillon and Molien mandate that fears of administrative difficulties
and fictitious claims should not shield a defendant from liability when a
serious wrong has been committed5 5 Unmarried cohabitants, whose al-
ternative lifestyle serves the same basic function as a familial relationship,
should not be denied legal redress as punishment for refusing to conform
to traditional notions of morality or because the judiciary seeks to avoid
administrative difficulties. A probable result of this conclusion is the legal
recognition of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought
by an unmarried heterosexual cohabitant. A further extension of this the-
ory would be to recognize the same cause of action brought by an unmar-
ried homosexual cohabitant. The following section will present the
application of the foreseeability tests of Dillon and Molien to the homo-
sexual plaintiff in both a physical risk and mental risk situation.
APPLICATION TO HOMOSEXUAL COHABITANTS
The increasing political activism of the homosexual community has re-
sulted in a growing awareness of the legal needs of that community by the
judiciary and the legislatures.5 6 Traditional notions of the family unit
252. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App.3d at 68,188 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
253. Seeid at60, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
254. See Comment, supra note 177, at 201.
255. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 736-37, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78;
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 925-30,616 P.2d at 818-21,167 Cal. Rptr. at 836-39.
256. See In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914,663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983) (holding
mandatory registration of sex offenders convicted under misdemeanor disorderly conduct
statute violated cruel and unusual punishment provision of California Constitution); Gay
Law Student's Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (holding that the California equal protection clause does not permit
privately owned utilities or the state to arbitrarily discriminate against homosexuals re-
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and lingering prejudice against homosexuals, however, have hampered le-
gal reform in this area.257 Unlike heterosexual couples who may choose
whether to marry, homosexual couples are denied the opportunity to
marry legally by state law. 58 Nevertheless, many of these couples form
stable and significant cohabitation arrangements which serve the same
function as a spousal relationship. 59 This comment suggests that the ar-
guments in favor of extending a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress to unmarried heterosexual cohabitants also should be
applicable to homosexual cohabitants in a physical risk or mental risk sit-
uation.
A. Recovery in a Physical Risk Situation
This author has argued that a spousal-like relationship should qualify
as a close relationship under the Dillon guidelines.2 6 The Butcher court
held that the increasing incidence of unmarried cohabitation in recent
years also increased the chance that a percipient witness to an accident
would be the "de facto" spouse of the primary victim and would suffer
emotional distress as a result.261 Butcher dismissed the social policy argu-
ments limiting the defendant's duty as no longer valid in contemporary
society and outweighed by the need to redress a wrong suffered by the
plaintiff.
The same logic could be applied to a physical risk situation involving a
homosexual couple. In California, the number of homosexual couples
openly living together in a spousal-like relationship has increased sub-
stantially in recent years.2 62 While recognition of the legal needs of homo-
sexual couples has been tentative, some courts have granted homosexual
couples rights in the area of family law.
2 63
Marvin v. Marvin, as previously noted, redefined the rights of unmar-
garding employment); Coleman, The Sexual Explosion:A Survey ofJudicialandLegislative
Developments in Sexual Law During the Past Decade, 4 SEX. L. RPTR. 21(1978).
257. See Oakes, Perceptions of Homosexuality by Justices of the Peace in Colonial Vir-
ginia, 4 SEx. L. RPrR. 35 (1978); see also Rivera, Our Straight LacedJudges: The LegalPosi-
lion of HomosexualPersons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
258. See Rivera, supra note 257, at 874-78.
259. See id. at 908. An example of the changing attitude of society toward homosex-
ual couples is reflected in the recent California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board de-
cision of Finnerty, Jr., Donovan v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 73 LA 385-107 (Dec. 5,
1983). The board held that the applicant had established that he was a good faith member
of the decedent's household and a dependent of the decedent. The board further held that a
homosexual relationship does not, in and of itself, bar awarding the applicant death bene-
fits. Id at 1-2 (opinion on file at the PacifcLaw Journal.)
260. See supra notes 97-154 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 203-23 and accompanyng text.
262. According to one report, 9.13% of the total United States population has had ei-
ther extensive or more than incidental homosexual experience. See Rivera, supra note 257,
at 800 n.4.
263. See id at 874-908.
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ried cohabitants with regard to financial interests in property.2' The deci-
sion did not necessarily limit these property rights to unmarried
heterosexual couples. Following the Marvin lead, a subsequent San Diego
superior court decision recognized the relationship of two lesbians as suf-
ficiently legitimate to require one of the women to pay support to the
other when the relationship ended.265 The trial judge based the holding on
the fact that the two women participated in a HolyUnion ceremony at the
Metropolitan Community Church and had signed an agreement that one
would take responsibility for the household and the other for financial
support.
266
In addition to awarding community property rights to homosexuals,
the courts are increasingly granting homosexual parents child custody.267
Custody more frequently is being given to the parent based on the per-
son's parenting abilities rather than on sexual orientation.268 Consistent
with the more tolerant trend in attitudes toward homosexual couples, a
Los Angeles superior court allowed an openly homosexual couple to
adopt a child.2 69 Increased community and legal recognition of homosex-
ual couples tends to support the theory that a homosexual cohabitant is a
foreseeable bystander plaintiff in a physical risk situation.
Consequently, thejudiciary should not bar a claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress by a homosexual couple able to prove the exis-
tence of a stable and significant relationship by applying the factors
presented in Butcher.271 Since Molien does not specifically require a close
relationship, 272 recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress may
be more easily obtained for a homosexual cohabitant in a mental risk situ-
ation.
B. Recovery in a Mental Risk Situation
A medical misdiagnosis of syphilis could have a detrimental effect on
most couples regardless of their marital status or sexual preference. As
previously suggested, the Molien standard for recovery should not be con-
fined to a situation in which the marital interests alone arejeopardized.27 3
A misdiagnosis of a serious or terminal disease might produce similar neg-
264. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
265. Richardson v. Conley, California Superior Court (San Diego, June 6, 1978); see
TheAdvocate, No. 245 at 12 (July 12, 1978).
266. See id
267. See Rivera, supra note 257, at 883-904.
268. See id at 903-04.
269. See TheAdvocate, No. 262 at 12 (March 8, 1979).
270. See supra notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
272. See Comment, supra note 177, at 199.
273. Seeid. at201.
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 15
ative repercussions between two persons sharing a close relationship.
A tragic misdiagnosis of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome2 74 or
the negligent treatment of a homosexual patient with this disease might
cause foreseeable emotional distress in the patient's homosexual cohabi-
tant. A physician who is aware that the patient shares a spousal-like rela-
tionship with another reasonably should conclude that a misdiagnosis or
mistreatment of the often deadly syndrome would have a serious effect
upon the patient and the patient's homosexual cohabitant. In the event of
a negligent misdiagnosis or treatment, recovery for emotional distress by
the patient as well as the patient's homosexual cohabitant, therefore,
should be granted.275
Social policy concerns regarding the exposure of the defendant to un-
limited liability may relieve the defendant of a duty of due care276 even in
this situation. Before the plaintiffs evidence of injury and causation is
weighed by the jury, the court must determine whether social policies
should preclude the plaintiff's right to a remedy.277 Despite an increasing
tolerance toward homosexuals, the court may choose to limit a defen-
dant's duty of due care for negligent infliction of emotional distress to
those plaintiffs who share a more conventional relationship. A person's
sexual preference, however, should not bar a meritorious claim for emo-
tional distress. A homosexual plaintiff who is able to overcome the burden
of proving serious emotional distress in a mental risk situation should be
allowed to recover.
CONCLUSION
Unmarried cohabitants are seeking to gain rights in areas that tradi-
tionally have been reserved for married couples. This author has consid-
ered the possibility of extending the right to state a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to unmarried cohabitants who share a sta-
ble and significant relationship. An analysis of the tort revealed that a de-
fendant owes a duty of care to those persons who are reasonably
foreseeable victims of the defendant's tortious conduct. Thus, unmarried
cohabitants must prove that they come within the definition of foresee-
able plaintiffs in order to recover for emotional distress.
The standard for determining foreseeability is dependent upon the type
274. "[F]irstfully describedin 1980, the disease destroys the immune system, leaving
its victims prey to all manner of viruses and bacteria." Wallis, Battling a Deadly New Epi-
demic, TIME, March 28, 1983, at 53.
275. Cf. Molien,27 Cal. 3dat922,616P.2d at816,167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
276. See PROSSER, supra note 31, at 328.
277. See supra notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
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of risk involved. 78 In a physical risk situation, a plaintiff who suffers emo-
tional distress from witnessing another's injury must prove that the
mental distress resulted in physical harm.279 In addition, the plaintiff must
satisfy the three-pronged foreseeability test formulated in Dillon.28 This
test includes the requirement that the plaintiff share a substantially close
relationship with the primary victim.28 A review of subsequent case law
indicated that most courts have interpreted the close relationship require-
ment narrowly, granting recovery only when a spousal or blood relation-
ship existed.282 Other courts have allowed recovery when evidence of a
family-like relationship has been established.283 This comment concluded
that spousal-like relationships also should satisfy the Dillon foreseeability
test.
The Molien decision governs the scope of the defendant's duty of due
care in a mental risk situation.284 This author noted that an unmarried co-
habitant might be able to recover for mental injury in this situation be-
cause the plaintiff need not prove a physical injury nor a close relationship
with the other victim. 285 A defendant's duty, according to Molien, is deter-
mined by a reasonable person standard.286 Likewise, plaintiffs evidence
of injury and causation isjudged by a reasonable person standard.287
In either a physical risk or mental risk situation, a plaintiff may be de-
nied relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress if prevailing social
policy limits the defendant's duty.288 An analysis of recent conflicting de-
cisions affecting the rights of unmarried cohabitants to an action for loss
of consortium revealed that one court has held that the social policy
against extending this remedy to cohabitants is no longer valid.289 By
analogy, this comment also concluded that similar social policy limita-
tions should not preclude cohabitants from a remedy for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
290
The author further proposed that the right to a claim for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress be extended to homosexual cohabitants who
share a significant and stable relationship.291 If the defendant owes a duty
of due care to unmarried cohabitants, then the sexual preference of the
278. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
280. See id
281. See iad
282. Seesupra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
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couple should not determine the merit of the claim.
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